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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/03/2004 Accident number: 272 
Accident time: 08:20 Accident Date: 10/08/2000 
Where it occurred: Nr Stajk and Miljaj, 
Gorazup region 
Country: Kosovo 
Primary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 21/08/2000 
ID original source: KC/MD/JF Name of source: KMACC 
Organisation: Name removed  





Date record created: 18/02/2004 Date  last modified: 18/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 3 
 
Map details 
Longitude: 20° 56' 65" Latitude: 42° 19' 22" 
Alt. coord. system: DM 640 710 Coordinates fixed by: GPS 
Map east: 46420 Map north: 46712 
Map scale: PRIZREN Map series: GSGS 5726 
Map edition: 1-GSGS Map sheet: 680 
Map name: 1:100,000  
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
1 
metal-detector not used (?) 
 
Accident report 
A Mine Accident Report was prepared for the country MACC and made available in August 
2000. The following summarises its content. (See also the Demining group’s Internal reports 
under Related papers.) 
The victim had been a deminer in neighbouring Bosnia Herzegovina for five years. The area 
being cleared had no minefield record but a pattern of mines had been found – consisting of 
"fragmentation mines protected by PMA-3 blast mines" [PMR-2A fragmentation mines]. The 
area was described as "semi-wooded" and ground conditions were hard and rocky with a high 
mineral content, so a "prodding drill was used". Photographs showed fairly thick bushy 
vegetation to two metres high. The weather was sunny with temperatures of "25 to 30 Celsius 
with a light breeze". The last QA visit to the site had been made eight days before. Because 
detectors were not used at the site, the QA inspection was "visual".  
The accident occurred at the start of the working day when the victim began working in the 
same lane as he had been working in on the previous day. Work started at 08:00 and he was 
"squatting on his knees" and prodding at 08:20 when he detonated a PMA-3 mine.  
The victim suffered "serious blast trauma to his right leg resulting in an amputation above the 
knee…". He also received "minor" injuries to his left leg and to both arms. 
The picture below shows the inside of the victim’s visor, heavily sooted. 
 
The victim was stabilised and taken to a helicopter landing pad within 22 minutes [34 minutes 
according to the itemised account in the same report] of the accident. At the pad, a German 
helicopter arrived ten minutes after the ambulance. The doctor on the helicopter treated the 
victim for "almost one hour" to stabilise him before the helicopter departed for Prizren. The 
total time taken to reach a surgical facility was 110 minutes.  
 
The picture above shows a clearance lane at the site and shows the typical vegetation. The 
vegetation at the clearance site, coupled with "the curvature of the clearance lane" meant that 







A photograph of the accident site showed the victim's base-stick ahead of the site of the 
detonation. The ground shown was made up largely of small stones. The victim's shears were 
pictured alongside the small crater, his helmet was several metres back up the lane. 
The victim's partner was the first on the scene and "informed the Team Leader". The two of 
them moved the victim "into a safe area". Two minutes later the medic arrived and began 
stabilising the victim. The Team Leader notified the demining group's "country manager to 
organise the evacuation".  
At 08:30 the victim was taken by ambulance to the helicopter landing strip, arriving 24 
minutes later. At 08:55 the helicopter landed and the German doctor on board treated the 
victim for 45 minutes before it departed at 09:55. [The record of times is confused and 
inconsistent in the original.] 
The investigators found that the medical equipment at the site was incomplete. They 
examined the victim's PPE and found traces of blast damage on his frag-jacket "and inside 
the helmet and visor". Photographs show the visor with the outside gleaming and smooth 
while the inside was blackened. There were also traces of damage on the inside of the front 
of the helmet. The victim's base stick had some traces of blast-sooting on it. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the victim was kneeling on both knees and prodding at the 
time of the accident. "He put pressure on the PMA-3 mine while he was concentrating on the 
left side of his base lane. He was trying to follow the pattern because he found a mine on the 
left side of the lane the previous day". They added "We will never know exactly what 
happened…. If he had… cleared along his base stick using an adequate detector he would 
have located the mine and avoided" the accident. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that the KFOR medical staff be thanked for their help and 
that "immediate action" be taken to include oxygen, scoop stretcher and blood pressure 
manometer in the demining group's medical kit. 
The investigators agreed with the demining group that a deminer should not get closer than 
10cm to his base stick when clearing on rocky ground, and that rocks should be carefully 
removed by hand. They further recommended that the demining group should purchase 
detectors capable of locating mines in laterite soil (and confirmed that the Mine-Lab could do 
this [no specific model was specified]). [The demining group were not using any metal 
detector during clearance.] 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 347 Name: Name removed 
Age: 36 Gender: Male 
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Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 1 hour 50 minutes 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Short visor 
Protection used:  Frag jacket, Helmet 
 






Leg Above knee 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A report based on statements and interviews with the medic on site stated that the medic 
responded to a call for assistance at 08:20 and met two deminers carrying the victim about 50 
metres from the accident site. He was transferred to a stretcher and examined. The medic 
found a 40cm long "open wound…from under the knee up to femur, a badly injured knee with 
an open fracture above the knee, and he was in a lot of pain. The wound was black of dust 
from the explosion but there was no large bleeding. He also had some minor wounds on his 
arms and hands". 
The medic cleaned, bandaged and immobilised the leg, set up an IV cannula (Ringer solution 
and analgesic Trodon, then took him to the ambulance. In the ambulance, the victim's minor 
wounds on his arms and legs were cleaned and bandaged en-route to the helicopter pad. The 
ambulance had no oxygen or blood pressure manometer. At the helicopter pad the victim was 
given "one more injection of Trodon because of the pain and a tourniquet was put on his leg 
because of increased bleeding". 
The lack of a "scoop stretcher" meant that the victim "had to be lifted from the stretcher and 
put on the ground before the KFOR doctor could treat him". The KFOR doctor gave the victim 
an "intravenous cannula, analgesic, oxygen, ECG and he was intubated and put to sleep". He 
was "treated on the ground for approximately one hour before they put him in the helicopter". 
"The medic was not allowed to go with the helicopter".   
In December 2001 the MACC reported that the Victim had been fitted with a permanent 
prosthesis and was living and working in Tusla, Bosnia. 
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Analysis 
This accident is classed as a “Missed-mine accident” because the injuries imply very strongly 
that the victim knelt on the mine (or on a stone over the mine) while he was working beyond it. 
The light injuries to hand and arms and the severe knee injury appear to corroborate this. 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Inadequate equipment" because the 
authorities in the country agree that detectors capable of finding the mines in the prevailing 
conditions were available, but not used by the demining group. The failure to provide 
adequate equipment is a “Management/control inadequacy”. 
Several other aspects of the accident indicate failing of management. These include the fact 
that the demining method and tools appears to have been inappropriate (using a needle-prod 
for excavation is actually impossible) and the absence of a full medical kit.   
The investigators did not make it clear whether they decided that the victim "put pressure" on 
the mine with his knee. The number of stones in the ground make it possible that he knelt on 
one side of a stone under which the mine was concealed. 
The severe sooting of the inside of the victim’s visor was not accompanied by any facial 
injury. This may indicate that the victim’s visor was fully raised, but if that were true the 
victim’s head would have had to have been very close to the detonation and directly over it – 
which does not match the investigator’s re-enactment position. It is possible that the helmet 
and visor were on the ground alongside the seat of the explosion. If the visor was not worn or 
was worn raised, the victim was poorly supervised. 
The accident report demonstrates an unusually thorough and critical approach to accident 
investigation. The Mine Action Co-ordination Centre that carried out the investigation was not 




Comment from the MACC manager (attached to the accident report) observed that this was 
the fifth accident in Kosovo where a Bosnian deminer had not been using a detector. In his 
opinion, the Bosnian deminers lacked confidence in the detectors and this lack of confidence 
was unjustified because of the recent advances in detector technology and the proximity to 
the surface of mines in Kosovo. He stated that "ground compensating detectors are essential 
in this environment". 
The MACC manager agreed with the demining group management that "complacency" was 
"a contributing factor" to the cause of this accident, and praised the group's internal 
investigation as "thorough…transparent…comprehensive".  
Three brief internal reports by the demining group were found on file and are reproduced 
below, edited for anonymity. 
 
Initial report (internal demining group) 
This is an initial report by [Technical Advisor] into the accident occurring in Stajk, Gorazup 
region. 
This accident occurred in the clearance lane on the site being worked by team 06. The lane 
being worked was very difficult terrain due to the ground conditions being very rocky and the 
high density of mines. Prior to this numerous PMA-3 mines had been found both on the 
surface and sub-surface. 
On investigation the following points were found; 
• Fragments of PMA-3 in and adjacent to the crater 
• Basestick forward of the crater 
• Prodder blown into bush on the right side of the clearance lane 
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• String length indicating cleared area 
• Blast on front of the crater indicating where the mine was initiated 
 
Conclusion 
The accident happened within 15mins of the deminer starting work within his lane. The 
deminer was the last person to work in the lane the previous day. 
The length of string from the last lane marker to the base stick’s left hand side is 
approximately 30cm. If the base stick was placed in it's original position (immediately prior to 
the blast) then the crater would be in the still uncleared area. 
The injury to the deminer is above the knee on the thigh indicating that the mine was not 
directly activated by the deminer's knee. 
The deminer's prodder is in a bush on the right side of the lane in an uncleared area 
indicating that he was using the prodder at the time of the explosion. The deminer's visor has 
most of the dirt/debris on the inside. This is because the mine was activated below the 
deminer. 
All of this information indicate that the deminer was working in the kneeling position on the far 
left of his base stick. His right knee moved forward slightly, also moving the base stick forward 
slightly. Then downward pressure on the rear of the mine, either by a stone or another 
activated the mine. If the mine had been directly activated by the deminer's knee then he 
would have suffered direct damage to the knee, but this was not the case. 
 
Internal [demining group] accident report 1 – preliminary 
Project Manager's pre-survey comments 
Having read and received all the statements from the personnel involved I have come up with 
the following points:- 
1. Team 06  were operating in the Gorozup area on Task Dossier S20-38 very close to the 
village of Stajk and Miljaj. They have been working in this area for a number of weeks 
under the supervision of the [Demining group]’s technical advisor for that area. The team 
were working in an area of a high concentration of anti-personnel mines both blast and 
fragmentation. I have visited this site on numerous occasions and in my opinion the 
clearance was made even more difficult due to the difficult terrain in which the deminers 
had to operate. 
2. The terrain consists of high density of bushes and the ground very hard with compact 
rocks and stones. Again this made it very difficult for the deminers to clear taking into 
account that the use of detectors was not possible due to the high mineral content and 
uneven rocky ground. Prodding was also made difficult due to the fact that while prodding 
the deminers had to physically remove rocks and stones from the clearance lane to 
achieve the required depth a stated in the SOPs. 
3. The injured deminer and his no. 2 operator had been working in this particular part of the 
mined area since opening up the clearance lane. This is normal practice for our deminers 
to stay in the same area therefore becoming totally familiar with the area they are working 
in. [The Victim] had been working at the base line at the close of operations on the 9th 
August 2000 and had physically closed down the lane himself prior to leaving the site. At 
approximately 8.00am on the morning of the 10th August 2000 [the Victim] and his no. 2, 
after being briefed by the Team Leader and conducting an equipment check proceeded 
into the mined area and along their clearance lane. Again it is normal practice for the last 
operator at the base line the day before to recommence operations the following day, 
thus preventing a break down in communications between the two operators. 
4. At approximately 8.20am on 10th August 2000 [the Victim] was injured while conducting 
clearance operations within his lane. At 8.22 am having been informed by the Team 
Interpreter the CASEVAC Emergency Procedure went into operation. In my opinion the 
extraction and treatment of the injured deminer from the minefield was faultless. All 
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operations in the area was suspended and the injured deminer, along with the medic and 
the interpreter proceeded from the mined area to the designated KFOR HLS. By this 
stage the KFOR CASEVAC helicopter was en route from Suva Reka to the HLS. At 
approximately 8.55am the helicopter landed at the HLS and from then onwards the KFOR 
Major Surgeon took over the treatment of the injured deminer. The helicopter medical 
crew worked on the deminer for approximately 45 minutes - this is normal practice for the 
KFOR CASEVAC medical crew to assess and stabilise the casualty before flying. The 
casualty was treated for his injuries including inserting fluids by means of intravenous 
infusion and then intubated prior to take off. The helicopter departed at approximately 
9.55am for the KFOR Field hospital in Prizren. 
5. At this stage it is very difficult to even attempt to establish the cause of the accident until a 
statement had been taken from the injured deminer himself. The deminer’s no. 2 although 
was 25m away from the scene of the accident could not keep a constant visual on his 
no.1 due to the terrain and the curvature of the clearance lane. Therefore he is unable to 
give us an accurate account of what actually happened. It is in my opinion and that of the 
technical adviser that the accident could have been caused with the deminer activating a 
mine by moving his knee forward of his known cleared area whilst clearing the far left 
extent of his base stick, thus causing his body to pivot moving his right knee forward 
possibly taking the base stick forward as well. The deminer was also concentrating on the 
far left of his clearance lane due to the fact that he had located a mine the night before 
albeit on the surface and also there was a tripwire visible on his immediate left. 
6. The anti-personnel mine being a PMA-3 detonated between the deminers right knee and 
left heel. The blast due to the hard ground was mostly directed upwards taking with it 
sharp debris such as stones and rocks. According to the team medic during the post 
accident interview and the KFOR Flight Surgeon who stated at the HLS on site and the 
HLS at the KFOR Barracks that there were major injuries to the casualty's inner and 
upper right thigh from the upper part of the knee cap upwards. There were no injuries to 
the deminer's left foot. At this stage this indicates that there was no direct pressure from 
the deminer onto the mine by either his knee or left foot. The impact of the blast was 
taken by the deminer's right inner thigh form just below his groin to the upper side of his 
right knee cap. The result of the blast caused a fourth degree open fracture of the right 
femur with the loss of a large amount of flesh from his inner thigh and severe damage to 
his knee cap. Unfortunately the injuries were so severe that the surgeon could not save 
the leg therefore the leg was amputated below the right groin. 
 
Post survey comments: 
On the 11th August 2000 myself, [Name excised] and the UNMACC Accident Investigation 
Board of Inquiry visited the site of the accident to establish its cause. After spending some 
time at the scene it was very difficult to establish what exactly occurred. After retrieval of the 
base stick and prodder it was apparent that the blast was forward of the base stick and that if 
the deminer was in the kneeling position and holding his prodder while clearing the extreme 
left of the clearance area the blast apparently was in the middle of the base stick and between 
the deminer's legs very close to his right leg. It was also established through interviewing the 
team leader that the deminer prods while kneeling down on both knees - this is due to an 
injury to his left foot he sustained during the war and that this position on both knees is most 
comfortable for him. 
It was also apparent from inspecting the crater that the mine was surrounded with sharp rocks 
and small stones which had a fragmentation effect to the mine resulting in abnormally severe 
injuries. 
On my return to Prizren I then visited the field hospital in an attempt to speak to the casualty 
and to meet the surgeon who conducted the operation. The casualty, although awake, was 
not in any fit state to give out any information regarding the accident and due to the fact that 
he was in intensive care and that he had only recently recovered form general anaesthetic it 
did not seem right to pursue any statement. I asked the surgeon a number of questions 
regarding his opinion of the injuries - attempting to establish whether the blast was to the side 
of the knee or directly underneath. His analysis of the injury was that the damage was so 





Again it is difficult to establish a definite cause of the accident without interviewing the 
casualty and even he might not know exactly what happened. Therefore we can only surmise 
at a probable cause at this stage. It is my opinion that the deminer while reaching across to 
clear the extreme left side of his clearance lane inadvertently dragged his right knee onto the 
base stick applying pressure to the stick consequently, possibly applying pressure to a stone 
that activated the mine. 
 
Recommendations: 
Again it is difficult to recommend a solution without knowing the cause. However to prevent 
the deminer from inadvertently applying pressure to the base stick with either his foot or 
knees/knees, I intend to amend SOPs. This will state while working in uneven rocky terrain 
the deminers knee or front part of the deminers foot must be no closer than 10cm to the base 
stick and the area of clearance forward of the base stick should exceed no further than 20cm 
thus preventing the deminer from reaching too far. To put this SOP into operation will be up to 
the discretion of the on-site Technical Advisor. 
I will also attempt to devise a more flexible base stick again to alleviate the problem of 
applying pressure to a large area. 
Signed: Country Manager 
 
Internal [Demining group] accident report 2 
Dated 14-08-00 
[The Demining group] MINE ACCIDENT INTERNAL INVESTIGATION REPORT 
  
Project Manager's conclusion and recommendations 
Having now visited the injured deminer on a number of occasions and had the opportunity to 
interview him not only personally but also in the presence of his Team Leader I have 
managed to establish the following conclusions and subsequently make the following 
recommendations. 
I managed to interview [The Victim] on the afternoon of the 12th August and although he was 
still very uncomfortable and in some pain he did attempt to tell me what he thought happened 
on the morning of the 10th August 2000. 
He explained that he was working in the clearance lane the afternoon before and located a 
PMA 3 AP mine albeit on the surface just before the cease of operations that day. He also 
noticed a tripwire form a PMR2A heading away from where he had located the mine on the 
surface. 
As normal, the next morning he commenced demining where he had left off the afternoon 
before, and in his opinion and according to his experience he knew there would be another 
mine very close, probably within the next 50cm. 
He commenced clearance 10cm back form where he had left off the day before as stated in 
SOP's and then studied the area to establish where the next mine might be. He then 
commenced clearance of the top left hand side of his clearance area in an attempt to locate 
the next mine. This location being the logical position for the next mine bearing in mind that 
there was tripwire to the left. From then on he does not remember much of what occurred 
next, he explained that he was at full stretch to the left and in his own words that he may have 
either moved his knee onto the base stick or worse moved his knee over the base stick into 
an uncleared area. 
He explained to me that he was 100% sure that there was another mine within the base stick 
area however he did not expect it to be where the explosion occurred. As the deminer has no 
8 
recollection of what happened I couldn't establish the actual cause of the accident. I must 
stress that I can only surmise of the probable cause. 
 
Conclusion 
We will never know exactly what occurred that morning due to the fact that there were no 
witnesses. [The Victim] was wearing his full protective clothing and working under the 
supervision of his Team Leader as according to [the Demining group]’s SOPs. The outcome 
of this accident was the detonation of a PMA 3 resulting in injury so severe that he had to 
have his right leg amputated just below the groin. It is possible that this accident could have 
been avoided if he had managed to control his instincts and adhered to SOPs. If the deminer 
had continued with his clearance procedure according to SOPs and cleared along his base 
stick he would have eventually located the next mine thus possibly avoiding such an awful 
accident. 
Also in fairness, the type of ground in which he was working was far from ideal. There is a 
strong possibility that he indirectly dislodged a stone with his leg thus setting off a chain of 
events resulting in the detonation of the mine. The cause might never be known, however I do 




I do not intend to undertake a retraining program, this will take up valuable clearance time, in 
my opinion it is not a matter of inexperience but that of complacency and a macho Balkans 
attitude. This is a problem that all organisations and companies working in the Balkans have 
encountered at some stage. I will ensure that all Technical Advisors and Team Leaders 
monitor their men even more closely and that any other breach of SOP will be followed by 
instant dismissal. 
 
As far as clearance procedures are concerned there will be no major changes to SOPs, the 
only change will be while working in uneven terrain such as rocky surfaces the deminer will 
get no closer to his base stick than 10cm. All loose rocks will be carefully removed by hand 
prior to clearance and placed behind the deminer. If some rocks are lodged then excavation 
of these rocks will be conducted. 
 
Final Thought 
[The Victim] is a very experienced mine clearance operator with at least six years commercial 
and humanitarian experience not only in Kosovo but in Bosnia and Croatia. He has been 
working with [Demining group] and in the same team on and off for over five years. He has 
also worked for [a second group], and last year worked in Kosovo for [Another Group]. He has 
been working in Kosovo on this [Demining group] contract since March this year and is a 
highly respected member of the team. 
Having worked with [Demining group] for the last 12 months they have proven to be a highly 
professional and hard working team of deminers who have taken their work seriously and 
responsibly. This not only shows in their general behaviour and attitude in the workplace, but 
in the statistics of mines found and areas cleared. However, my personal opinion I stress this 
is my own opinion having worked and trained Bosnian deminers for a number of years, they 
occasionally allow their experience in this field to get the better of them, and they tend to 
forget the constant dangers involved which can affect their judgements. This tragic accident 
occurred while [The Victim] was conducting humanitarian demining within Kosovo, a task he 
believed in. He fully understood the dangers, like all deminers from the Balkans; unfortunately 
a minor human error resulted in such a tragic conclusion. 




The following are signed statements from witnesses, edited for anonymity. 
 
Team Leader 
We have been operating in [the] location from 21st July to 10th August '00- the day when the 
accident occurred. I have had information about that location that a civilian stood on mine 
300m far from RP1. I hadn't further information for the location. I used to brief every morning 
with deminers before operating in the minefield. The location we operating in is stony with 
high vegetation and difficult conditions to work in. In that location we have found surface laid 
mines and buried PMA-3 and PMR-2A. They have been removed or demolished. Every day 
we have found a couple of PMA-3 and PMR-2A mines. 
On the 9th August we have found four (4) PMA-3 mines. When the accident occurred [the 
Victim] and [his partner] were working at the same lane. The day before a PMA-3 was found 
by [the Victim] in the same lane. The mine was surface laid, and removed safely and then 
transported to the store. Then I told [the Victim] to close the lane and have a rest. On the lane 
number four we have found three (3) PMA-3. 
On 10th August we have had the briefing at the office with [Technical Advisor] up to 06.20. 
Then we departed office, checked the radio and then arrived to the location. At 0800 I had 
briefing with deminers before starting the operation in the minefield. The deminers then pulled 
out the equipment from the vehicle and started demining. Then I went to check the deminers 
and I arrived to 3rd pair, and then I heard an explosion. It was 0820. Then I heard the voice of 
[deminer no.2]. He was rushing and informed me that an accident occurred. I informed 
immediately the medic and stopped the operations, and ran into the lane where the accident 
occurred. I started to give first aid to [the Victim]. Then we pulled him out of minefield to safe 
lane. All the deminers came here. 
The medic gave him first aid from 0820 to 0830 and then we carried him to emergency 
vehicle. Then I called the deminers and talked with them to be calm. Then [name excised] 
arrived at 1015. We went to the place of the accident where [he] took some photos and then 
closed the lane. 
 
Deminer No.2 
On 9th August I and [the Victim] have worked in pairs and found a PMA-3 mine. It was 
removed by the team leader. At 13.30 our Team Leader came to our lane and checked lane 
as he does every day at the end of work. We closed the lane and got out of minefield. [The 
Victim] was the last deminer to clear in this lane. 
On 10th August we had a briefing with our Team Leader. [The Victim] who closed the lane 
himself opened the lane and started demining. As the lane wasn't straight (bent) we couldn't 
see each other. at 08.20 I heard an explosion and rushed towards [the Victim], and saw that 
he was injured, and immediately informed my team leader. Me and team leader pulled him 
out of the minefield to safety lane. 
Regarding the terrain I have to stress that it is stony, a lot of trees and contains surface laid 
and buried mines PMA-3 and PMR-2A. 
 
Team no.6 interpreter 
As usual we arrived on site and informed 31 by radio that we had arrived, as well as a radio 
communications check. After that, a site briefing was held by the Team Leader, followed by 
equipment preparations. After that mine clearance operations began. I was in the rest area 
talking with the medic when we heard an explosion. The Team Leader call the medic to 
inform him about the accident. I then started to inform 31 base that an accident occurred and 
also gave them a grid number of HLS. At that time I had no further information about the 
casualty so I waited in the vehicle which was in the beginning of the safe lane. 
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They then took the casualty from the minefield and put him in the vehicle. Then I kept in 
contact with 31 Base and informed them of the name, blood group, type of injury, ETA at the 
HLS. When we arrived on HLS I also informed 31 Base that we arrived as well as condition of 
casualty. When the helicopter landed, KFOR doctor gave first aid to casualty. 
I was there till helicopter departure to VJ Barracks - KFOR Hospital. After that we went back 
to the site to close down site and returned back to [the] office in Prizren. 
 
Medic 
On 10th August 2000 we arrived on site at 7.40 I established that everyone is prepared and 
ready for work (demining). At 7.50 I checked the vehicle's condition and medical equipment. 
At 8.00 I did a radio check with team leader. Some time at 8.20 I heard an explosion (I was in 
the medical area). Right after the explosion the Team Leader called me on the radio to inform 
me that we had an accident. I wore jacket and helmet and took medical bags and ran to the 
place of the accident. Whilst running to the place the team leader informed me in which lane 
is the injury. When I arrived to the safety lane of 2 metres the deminers were already carrying 
the casualty towards me. Immediately I established large knee injury of right leg and light 
injuries of both hands. 
Firstly I administered first aid on wounded knee. All the time the injured was conscious. I took 
the first abdominal dressing and put it on the wounded area and then added another stronger 
dressing. Then I inserted the drip in the left hand and then gave him IV drip and one ampoule 
of Trodon 50 (analgesic) 1ml intravenous. I established that the other injuries could be 
dressed while transporting the casualty and told the deminers to take him to the ambulance 
vehicle. 
All the time I was talking with the casualty. We put him in the vehicle which was in place and 
switched on the rotation light. While transporting the casualty to the HLS I checked also two 
light injuries. All the time I was in contact with him. While transporting him we were escorted 
with the 2nd vehicle. When we arrived on HLS we pulled the injured out of the vehicle. During 
the transport I was informing the interpreter about the injury and condition of the casualty. On 
the HLS were two medics and they helped me until the helicopter arrived. 
Due to the pain we gave him one more Trodon 50 (analgesic). When the helicopter arrived I 
gave all information to KFOR Doctors regarding the casualty, what was done and what we 
gave him from analgesics and infusion. After KFOR assumed responsibility I stayed with the 
casualty for information. The casualty was conscious throughout and was in pain. After our 
job was completed they transported him with helicopter and we returned back to base. 
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